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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is nothing if not original.
'Its last and most startling performance has been to create a
new canon of constitutional construction, which
'The right of a
Legislature has hitherto escaped the ingenuity of the sages of
to limit the the law, that of the "policy" of the constitution.
suffrage
In the decision of the question raised as to the
constitutionality of the. provision in the statute of that state
creating the Superior Court, that in all elections for judges of
that court no voter shall cast his ballot for more than six candidates, this is made one of the controlling factors. In answer
to the objection that the enumeration in the constitution of
certain offices for which only a limited vote can be cast
,excludes all others not named, the learned judge who delivered
the opinion says, if the papers are to be trusted, "the limited
voting plan was recognized and adopted in the constitution,
because it was deemed wise that as to offices non-partisan in
character, or which at least should be, the minority party
ought to have representation, and this could only be attained
by limiting voting. Does the expression of this thing necessarily exclude other things not expressed? As the same
reasons for the plan exist as to like offices thereafter created,
is it not a necessary deduction that a like plan like that expressed should be followed ? 'Does not the whole spirit of the
6onlstitttonp
plainly so impily, while there is not a word indicating
that such plan as to other or new courts is forbidden ? In the
cases specified the constitution is mandatory. It says to the
legislature, in thus enumerating them, Thou shalt prescribe
the limited voting plan. Zn the cases not enumerated it is dis.cretionary."
This is wide of the real question, which is not whether the
constitution takes away the power of passing such a law from
the legislature, but whether the legislature has been granted
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that power, in the face of a constitutional provision that "alt
elections shall be free and equal; and no power, civil or military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of
the right of suffrage: " Const. Pa. Art. I, § 5. Such a provision has always been held to create in the qualified citizens of
the commonwealth a vested right to the exercise of the suffrage, subject to no restrictions on that right except those
prescribed by the sovereign people, acting through the medium
of a constitutional convention.
Is such an election as that prescribed in the statute " free
and equal?"
It is not free, for the voter cannot vote for all
the officers to be elected. This objection cannot be pushed
aside by claiming, as has been done, that the " election" for
Superior Court judges is one and indivisible, for such is not
the case.
In order that an election of two or more candidates should
be a unit, it is necessary that the ticket on which their names
appear should be elected or defeated as a whole; and, if this
is not the case, but the individual candidates are elected according to the votes cast, then there is practically an election for
each candidate, and a refusal to permit the voter to vote for
each is a violation of the constitutional provision. Further,
the constitution expressly provides that a voter shall have theright to vote at all elections, (Art. VIII, § I ;) and if this does
not mean for every candidate at an election, it means nothing.
For, if it be possible for the legislature to declare that no person
shall vote for " more than" any number of candidates for an
office, it is equally within its power to prescribe that he shall
not vote for "more than" one or more officers to be elected at
an election; or, in other words, that if sheriff, assemblyman,
prothonotary, recorder, &c., are all to be elected, as they
frequently are, at one time, the legislature can limit the voter
to casting his ballot for but one of those officers. If the power
exists for one purpose, it must for all.
The Supreme Court does not advert to this latter phase of
the question; but notice how glibly the court glides over the
objection that the constitution means that the voter shall have
a right to vote for every candidate.
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"No sound reason has been urged in the argument why we
should enlarge the scope of the words 'shall be entitled t(>
vote at all elections,' by practically adding also for every candidate or a group of candidates for the same office. The
constitution does not say so, and has never been interpreted
so to mean. It clearly appears that the interpretation put
upon the language of the constitution by those who lived at
the time it was framed and adopted was the same as that put
upon like language in 1874 by the Legislature of 1895 ; that
the interpretation put upon the constitution of 1838 was
acquiesced in by the bar, the courts and the legislature for a.
period of thirty-five years until the adoption of the Constitution of 1874; that, in two other instances, offices of the
highest importance, jury commissioners and delegates to a
constitutional convention, were, by legislative enactment, filled
on the limited voting plan."
It does not follow, however, as the learned judge assumes,
that because an unconstitutional act has not been called in
question, that it can be thereby made constitutional. Mere
acquiescence in. two instances of the kind is not that evidence
of long-continued interpretation which is necessary to establish a canon of constitutional construntion.
Again, it is also beyond question that such an election as
that prescribed by the act under discussion is not 1; equal."
In the State of Pennsylvania there are, roughly speaking,
5oo,ooo voters of the dominant party, and 4oo,ooo of the
minority. By the system adopted, these latter votes are given
but one-sixth of the voting power possessed by the'majorityIt would be hard to imagine a clearer case of inequality. But
the court seems to have no difficulty in practically construing
"equal " to mean "unequal; " and so this little objectiorn
does not even halt it for a moment.
This act is also, for the reason above stated, an "interference"
with the right of the voter to cast his vote at an election. It
will be objected that the provision of the constitution does not
apply to a law passed by the legislature, limiting the right of
suffrage, but to interference with an elector at the polls. Yet
the legislature is a "civil power," and if it pass a law forbid-
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ding any class of citizens to vote, it would be as effectual an
-1 interference" with the freedom of the election as the action
of any body of police or armed force could possibly be. True,
it would violate another provision of the constitution; but
that would not make it any the less a violation of this.
It is, therefore, hardly open to question that the electors
possess a vested right to vote for every candidate at an election, unless they have surrendered that right ; and it is equally
beyond doubt that the provision of the act cited is an infringement of that right. The whole question, accordingly, turns
on the power of the legislature to enact such a provision,
which it has at least no pimafacie right to enact. This right
is demonstrated by the court by the simple assertion that the
right to establish limited voting is, in all cases not enumerated
in the constitution, discretionary with that body; and that
assumption is supported by the following supposititious reasoning, "whatever the people have not by their constitution
restrained themselves from doing, they, through their representatives in the legislature may do. This latter body represents their will just as completely as in a constitutional convention. In all matters left open by the written constitution
of the use the people may make of this unrestrained power,
it is not the business of the courts to inquire." This is begging the question, which is simply, as said before, whether the
legislature possesses the power to pass such a law. It needs
more than a simple assertion of this right to establish it;, and
yet this is all that the opinion of the court, stripped of its
verbiage, and reduced to intelligible language, amounts to.
It may not be amiss to call attention to the peculiar seesaw motion of this court on the general question of constitutionality. It is not many years since it went as far west as
California to find a precedent for deciding a mechanics' lien
law unconstitutional, and when it did find it, was not deterred
from using it by the fact that it rested on a differently worded
statute, and had no proper application to the case then in hand.
This difficulty was got over by the masterly use of the principle that the legislature cannot interfere with the inherent right
of a man to make his own contracts. But this inherent right
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is protected by no constitutional provision of which the writer
is aware, although one is often cited to support it; and is no
more inherent than the right of suffrage. Now, however, the
court has disregarded a precisely similar case (State v. Constantine,42 Ohio St. 437), in its eagerness to hold the law now
in question constitutional. All of which goes to show that
the "wavering balance" is not exactly "right adjusted."
In justice to them, however, it must be added that Chief
Justice STmPaTrR and Justice WILLIAMS dissented. A
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